WEP special issue – published in 2015

The special issue of West European Politics on ‘Explaining Legislative Organization in European Democracies’ – which I am guest-editing – has now been published. Questions regarding the origin and evolution of legislative institutions are at the heart of comparative legislative studies. Much research in this area focuses on the US Congress; in contrast, comparative studies of European democracies have been more limited. Addressing this imbalance, this special issue showcases newly emerging research on legislative organization in Europe. In doing so, it brings together contributions that explore the rationales behind the emergence of, and variation in, national European voting practices, investiture rules, minority rights, committee power, agenda control, debating rules, and individual MPs’ rights.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Legislative Organization and its Determinants in European Parliamentary Democracies
Radoslaw Zubek

Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison
Simon Hug, Simone Wegmann and Reto Wüest

Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies
José Antonio Cheibub, Shane Martin and Bjørn Erik Rasch

Explaining Reforms of Parliamentary Minority Rights: A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application
Ulrich Sieberer and Wolfgang C. Müller

Coalition Government and Committee Power
Radoslaw Zubek

Legislative Committees as Uncertainty Reduction Devices in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies
Luigi Curini and Francesco Zucchini

The Origins of Parliamentary Agenda Control: A Comparative Process Tracing Analysis
Michael Koß

The Centralization of Parliamentary Policy Statements in Western European Parliaments
Julia F. Keh

Electoral Incentives and Individual Parliament Members’ Rights
Yael Shomer

New article published online in Party Politics

Radoslaw Zubek, Heike Klüver, Legislative Pledges and Coalition Government (Party Politics, Online First). In this article, we examine how coalition cabinets fulfil post-electoral legislative agendas. Many coalitions announce programs identifying bills that they plan to introduce to parliament in the months ahead. We argue that the fulfilment of such pledges is driven by differences in the divisiveness and salience of legislative initiatives. We test our theoretical expectations based on an empirical analysis of over 500 legislative pledges made by the Polish cabinet between 2008 and 2011.