Radoslaw Zubek and Twan van der Togt (2027) Breaking with Lotteries in European Political Development: An Informational Perspective. Journal of Historical Political Economy, 7(1).

The decline of political lotteries during early democratization presents an important puzzle in European political development. While prior accounts link this decline to the rise of organized parties, we argue that a need for informational efficiency was a major catalyst. We test our argument by analyzing the Dutch parliament’s reform of committee appointment between 1868 and 1888. Using original data, we show that lottery-based appointment produced committees that tended to be unrepresentative and inexperienced relative to the chamber as a whole. An analysis of over 400 government bills reveals that this lack of representativeness and experience undermined committee specialization during legislative review. A qualitative analysis of floor debates further shows MPs explicitly sought more representative and experienced committees to facilitate specialization. Finally, a comparison of lottery and speaker-based appointments suggests MPs could plausibly expect the latter to enhance informational efficiency. These findings contribute to broader research on how partisan and informational motivations shape political institutions.